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CHANGE OF POSITION: THE VIEW FROM
ENGLAND
Andrew Burrows*

1.

THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE DEFENSE

In Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd, the House of Lords for the
first time accepted that there is a change of position defense to a
restitutionary claim founded on unjust enrichment.2 In Lord Goff's
words, "[t]he principle is widely recognised throughout the common
law world.... The time
for its recognition in this country is, in my
3
overdue."
long
opinion,
There are several reasons of principle or policy for
wholeheartedly supporting that acceptance of the defense:
(i) The essential concern of the change of position defense
is with the defendant's loss of enrichment (i.e.,
"disenrichment"). English law's traditional insistence,
through the estoppel defense, that the loss had to be
induced by the claimant's representation was too
restrictive. For example, if the payee has in good faith
incurred a loss by relying on a payment being his or
hers, it is hard to see why a court should additionally
insist on a representation by the payor.
4
(ii) According to Avon County Council v. Howlett,5
estoppel can only operate as an all-or-nothing defense.
In contrast, change of position, divorced from the rule
of evidence strictures of estoppel, can operate in a pro
tanto fashion. The latter is more appropriate for
*

Norton Rose Professor of Commercial Law, University of Oxford;

Fellow of St. Hugh's College.
1. [1991] 2 A.C. 548 (H.L.) (Eng.).
2. See id. at 579.
3. Id. at 579-80.
4. [1983] 1 All E.R. 1073 (C.A. 1982) (Eng.).
5. See id. at 1078.
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restitution because it can be geared to the precise
6
extent of the loss of enrichment.
(iii) Peter Birks suggests that the strongest argument in
principle for change of position "lies in the logic of
subjective devaluation." 7 The argument runs as
follows: If the defendant uses money received to buy
benefits which would not otherwise have been bought,
liability to make restitution to the payor in effect forces
the defendant to pay for benefits that the defendant did
not want; denial of change of position is therefore
inconsistent with the acceptance in the law of
restitution of the importance of a defendant's
subjective devaluation.
(iv) The expansion of the grounds for restitution, most
obviously for mistaken payments (which can now
include payments made by mistake of law), requires
counterbalancing by an expansion of the restitutionary
defenses to include change of position. Without that
defense there might be too much restitution, both in the
"floodgates of litigation" sense and from the
perspective of giving inadequate security of receipt to
payees.
II. THE INGREDIENTS OF THE DEFENSE

A. The Narrow and Wide Versions of the Defense
Since the acceptance of change of position in England, attention
has shifted to the precise ingredients of the defense. The House of
Lords in Lipkin Gorman expressly left this open for case law
development. 8 However, Lord Goff's tentative formulation was very
broad:
At present I do not wish to state the principle any less
broadly than this: that the defence is available to a person
whose position has so changed that it would be inequitable
6. See infra Part II.B.8.
7. PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 413
(1989).
8. See Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd., [1991] 2 A.C. 548 (H.L.) (Eng.).
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in all the circumstances to require him to make restitution,
or alternatively to make restitution in full. 9
Cases subsequent to Lipkin Gorman have slowly but surely been
clarifying the ingredients of the defense.
Two main versions of the defense can be and have been
articulated. First, the narrow view is that change of position is the
same as estoppel minus the representation. 10 The defendant must
have detrimentally relied on the benefit as being his to keep. Birks
has written of change of position, "This defence is like estoppel with
the requirement of a representation struck out. In other words the
enriched defendant succeeds if he can show that he acted to his
detriment on the faith of the receipt."'" This version is embodied in
section 94B of the New Zealand Judicature Act 1908,12 according to
which mistaken payments may not be recoverable
if the person from whom the relief is sought received the
payment in good faith and has so altered his position in
reliance on the validity of the payment that in the opinion of

the Court, having regard to all possible implications in
respect of other persons, it is inequitable13 to grant relief, or
to grant relief in full, as the case may be.
This version derives further support from Rural Municipality of
Storthoaks v. Mobil Oil Canada Ltd., 4 in which the Supreme Court
of Canada first accepted change of position as a defense. Martland J
said, "[I]t should be open to the Municipality to seek to avoid the
obligation to repay the moneys it received if it can be established that
changed its circumstances as a result of the receipt
it had materially
15
of the money."'
The alternative wide view says that detrimental reliance is not a
necessary ingredient and that the defendant should have a defense
where his position, consequent on the benefit, has so changed that it
would be inequitable to order restitution. This is the version of the
9. Id. at 580.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See 3 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 523-24 (1978).
BIRKS, supranote 7, at 410.

Judicature Act, 1908, § 94B (N.Z.).
Id. (emphasis added).
[1975] 55 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (Can.); see also David Sec. Pty. Ltd. v.

Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 C.L.R. 353, 386 (Austl.)
(illustrating the High Court of Australia's acceptance of the defense).
15. RuralMunicipality ofStorthoaks, [1975] 55 D.L.R. (3d) at 13.
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defense adopted by section 142(1) of the Restatement of the Law
Restitution.'6 This has also been Goff and Jones' preferred view. In
the third edition of their book, The Law of Restitution, they wrote:
[U]nlike the legislature in New Zealand, we would not
restrict the defence of change in position to cases where the
defendant has "altered his position in reliance on the
validity of the payment." No doubt, many cases of change
of position will fall within that description. But there are
others which do not, where it would be inequitable to order
the defendant to make restitution.... The surest guide for
the future is, we think, to be found in the broad general
statement in section 142(1) of the Restatement of
Restitution. Each case will have to be judged on its own
facts in order to determine whether it is just and equitable to
require the defendant to make restitution. 17
Of the two versions being considered, Lord Goff in Lipkin
Gorman, tentatively supports the wide view. On the facts of Lipkin
Gorman, either version of the defense would have produced the same
result. In that case, the relevant change of position was winnings
paid to a thief on the assumption that the money he was betting with
was his (and hence, the gaming club's) to keep, whereas in fact, it
was stolen from the claimant solicitors.' 8 Although the amount of
stolen money staked was much higher, the overall enrichment
received by the defendant club from the stolen money was about
£155,000.19 It was this sum that was awarded in restitution. As is
expressly recognized in Lord Goff s judgment, the House of Lords
took a rough-and-ready, rather than a strictly logical, approach to the
acute factual difficulties in applying change of position to winnings
paid out on bets: for on a strict approach, winnings on a bet relate to,

16. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION

§ 142(1) (1937).

17. ROBERT GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 693-94
(3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter GOFF & JONES (3d ed.)]; cf ROBERT GOFF &
GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 822 (5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter
GOFF & JONES (5th ed.)] (summarizing Lord Goff s formulation of the defense

in Lipkin Gorman, which gives common law support, from the 1991 case, to
the theory propounded in the Third Edition).
18. See Lipkin Gorman, [1991] 2 A.C. at 548.
19. See id. at 559.
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and cancel 20out, only the receipt of that particular bet and not other
losing bets.
One implicit limitation of the wide view is the necessity for a
sufficient causal link between the defendant's unjust enrichment and
his change of position.2 1 In other words, the defense must be
concerned with loss of benefit (i.e., "disenrichment") and not with
general hardship suffered by the defendant. Say, for example, the
unjustly enriched defendant, subsequent to receipt, is made
financially redundant or is injured in a car crash. Or say, having
received a mistaken payment of £100 the defendant in turn has £500
stolen from her, which would have been stolen irrespective of the
mistaken payment. These changes of circumstance may make it
more difficult for the defendant to repay the claimant, but they ought
not to afford a defense to restitution. Unless the subject is to
disintegrate into a case-by-case discretionary analysis of the justice
of individual facts, far removed from principle, it is imperative that,
even on the wide formulation, there is a sufficient causal link
between the defendant's unjust enrichment and his pecuniary loss.
The Court of Appeal in Scottish Equitable plc v. Derby22 has
expressly supported this position. There, Robert Walker LJ said,
"The fact that the recipient may have suffered some misfortune (such
as a breakdown in his health, or the loss of his job) is not a defence
linked (at least on a 'but for' test)
unless the misfortune is causally
23
receipt."
with the mistaken
A crucial practical question is what should be the test for that
sufficient causal link. As Walker LJ indicated, it should at least be
for the defendant to show that but for the enrichment received he
would not have suffered the loss. 24 Yet, by analogy to the parallel
position in relation to compensatory damages, (namely, to what
extent subsequent benefits should be taken into account to reduce the
plaintiffs loss), one should probably add that, even if factually
caused, the loss is irrelevant if too indirectly related to (i.e., too far

20. See id. at 582-83.
21. Even on the narrow version of the defense one may want some causal
limitation over and above "reliance."
22. [2001] 3 All E.R. 818 (C.A.) (Eng.).

23. Id. at 827.
24. See id.
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removed from or essentially coincidental to) the enrichment
received.
The main range of situations where the above narrow and wide
versions of change of position may produce different results is where
a third party or a natural event brings about loss. For example,
money mistakenly paid to the defendant is immediately stolen or
destroyed by fire. Or assume that a building the claimant is erecting
for the defendant is half complete when destroyed by fire. In those
examples, only the wider version of change of position would afford
a defense because the defendant has not suffered the loss as a result
of relying, in any meaningful sense, on the benefit being his or hers.
Which of the two versions of change of position is to be
preferred? Although one advantage of the narrower version is that it
is more closely tied to the existing law since it is closer to the longestablished defense of estoppel, the wider view is to be preferred.
For example, it seems grotesque that a defendant who is mistakenly
(perhaps even negligently) paid £100,000 by his bank, which is
immediately stolen from him, 25 can be held (strictly) liable to
restitution of £100,000. Even though the subsequent loss of the
benefit cannot be blamed on the bank, the fact remains that the bank
started the chain of events by first making the mistaken payment.
Furthermore, there is much to be said at this stage in its
development, for holding the law of restitution in check by a wider,
rather than a narrower, change of position defense. The wide view
has now won the support of the Court of Appeal in Scottish
Equitableplc. Walker LJ said,
The judge noted the view, put forward by Andrew
Burrows (The Law of Restitution (1993) pp 425-428) that
there is a narrow and a wide version of the defence of
change of position, and that the wide view is to be
preferred. The narrow view treats the defence as 'the same
as estoppel minus the representation' (so that detrimental
reliance is still a necessary ingredient). The wide view
looks to a change of position, causally linked to the
mistaken receipt, which makes it inequitable for the
recipient to be required to make restitution. In many cases
either test produces the same result, but the wide view
25. That is, the defendant would not otherwise have lost £100,000.
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extends protection to (for instance) an innocent recipient of
a payment which is later stolen from him.
In this court Mr[.] Stephen Moriarty QC... did not argue
against the correctness of the wide view, provided that the
need for a sufficient causal link is clearly recognised....
In my view Mr[.] Moriarty was right to make that
concession. Taking a wide view of the scope of the defence
approach.., to the recognition
facilitates 'a more generous
26
of the right to restitution.'
The wide view has also been adopted by the New Zealand Court
of Appeal in National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. v. Waitaki
InternationalProcessing(NI) Ltd.27 In that case, the claimant bank
mistakenly paid NZ $500,000 to the defendant. 28 The defendant told
the bank of the mistake and, despite the bank's insistence, believed
throughout that it was not entitled to the money. 29 The defendant
then lost the money by investing it, without security, in a company
that became insolvent. 30 The majority of the New Zealand Court of
Appeal (Thomas and Tipping JJ) held that section 94B of the
Judicature Act 1908 did not apply to these facts. 31 Given the
defendant's belief that it was not entitled to the money, it could not
be said to have "altered ... [its] position in reliance on the validity of

the payment." 32 In contrast, the defendant could rely on the non33
statutory change of position defense put forward in Lipkin Gorman
because it was wider and was not dependent on detrimental reliance
the wider version
on the validity of the payment. Thomas J said that
34
superior."
"obviously
was
of change of position

26. Scottish Equitable plc, [2001] 3 All E.R. at 827 (citing Lord Goff in
Lipkin Gorman, [1991] 2 A.C. at 581).
27. [1999] 2 N.Z.L.R. 211 (C.A. 1998).
28. See id. at 213.
29. See id at 213-14.
30. See id. at 215.
31. See id. at 227, 232.

32. Id. at 227 (citing Judicature Act, 1908, § 94B (N.Z.)).
33. The Privy Council in Goss v. Chilcott, [1996] 1 A.C. 788, 798-99
(N.Z.), accepted that the common law change of position defense could be
applied in New Zealand despite section 94B of the Judicature Act 1908.
34. Nat'l Bank of New Zealand Ltd. [1999] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 228-29.
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B. Eight FurtherIssues
1. Does change of position cover losses incurred prior to the receipt
of the benefit? In other words, does it extend to anticipatory, as well
as subsequent, change of position?
Until recently, in almost all discussions of the defense, the
assumption was that it only applies to subsequent losses. This was
expressly stated in section 142(1) of the Restatement of the Law of
Restitution: "The right of a person to restitution from another
because of a benefit received is terminated or diminished if, after the
receipt of the benefit, circumstances have so changed that
it would be
35
inequitable to require the other to make full restitution.
Yet there seems to be no significant distinction between the
following two defendants. D1 who, having been paid £1,000 by the
claimant by mistake, pays £100 to charity; and D2 who, having been
mistakenly told that he has won £1,000, pays £100 to charity and
then is subsequently mistakenly paid the £1,000. Although D2's
change of position was consequent on the expectation of payment,
rather than on an actual payment, and although D2 could not have
directly enforced such an expectation (absent a contract or
promissory estoppel), that seems unimportant given that the concern
here is with a defense to restitution. As I have previously written,
"the fact that the defendant would have no active claim to recoup
particular losses does not mean that those losses should not be taken
into account as a defence to restitution." 36 The crucial common
feature is a clear causal link between the defendant's loss of £100
and the mistaken payment of £1,000. If the defendant were required
to make restitution of £1,000, he would be worse off by £100 than if
the payment, or the indication of payment, had never been made.

35. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 142(1) (1937); see also
3 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 510 (1978) (affirming that

such a defense of change of position arises only when one who has received a
benefit for which he was required to make restitution has changed position
after receipt of the benefit).
36. Andrew Burrows, Swaps and the Friction between Common Law and
Equity, 1995 RESTITUTION L. REv. 15, 21. In that article I recanted from the
tentative view, expressed in ANDREW BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION
424 (1st ed. 1993) [hereinafter BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION], that the

defense applied only to a subsequent change of position.
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Clarke J, in South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council v.
Svenska Internationalplc, took the contrary view that anticipatory
change of position does not count. 37 This was one of the many
interest rate swap cases, except here, it was the bank rather than the
local authority that was the defendant. The defendant bank sought to
establish that it had changed its position by incurring losses on
"hedging transactions" (including valid swap contracts with other
banks) that had been entered into as a consequence of, and to limit
the risk on, the void swap contract with South Tyneside. 38 Those
hedging contracts were entered into prior to the receipt of payments
from South Tyneside. 39 Clarke J said,
[Slave perhaps in exceptional circumstances, the defence of
change of position is designed to protect a person who
receives money in good faith and who thereafter changes
his position in good faith so that it would be inequitable to
require him to repay part or all of the money to its rightful
owner.

40

More specifically, the defense was thought to be inapplicable on the
facts because the bank's reliance in entering into the hedging
contracts was upon the apparent contractual promise of South
Tyneside rather than upon the receipt of any payments.
However, the Privy Council has now forcefully expressed the
better view (and Clarke J's decision is now consequently regarded as
dependent on the exceptional facts of that case) 41 in Dextra Bank &
37. See [1995] 1 All E.R. 545 (Q.B. 1994) (Eng.); see also Westdeutsche
Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council, [1994] 4 All
E.R. 890, 948-49 (Q.B. 1993) (Eng.) (explaining Hobhouse J's reasons, at first
instance, for change of position not to include "hedging contracts").
38. See S. Tyneside Metro. Borough Council, [1995] 1 All E.R. at 545.
39. See id. at 549-55.
40. Id. at 566.
41. It is hard to see that the decision can be reconciled with the Privy
Council's reasoning. On the face of it, losses on "hedging contracts" should

have constituted change of position (unless, where those contracts were
themselves void, the losses could have been avoided by claiming restitution).
Goff and Jones criticize Clarke J's reasoning and decision: "[I]t is inequitable
to conclude that the bank should repay its gain made on the swap but should
not be allowed to set off its losses on the hedging transactions." GOFF &
JONES (5th ed.), supra note 16, at 823. One conceivable justification for
ignoring the hedging contracts may be that to take them into account would cut
across the counter-restitution that was allowed in treating the claim as being
merely for the net enrichment. Another possible justification is that once one
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4 2 Here the claimant, Dextra, drew a
Trust Co. v. Bank of Jamaica.
check for U.S. $2,999,000 on its bankers in favor of the defendant,
the Bank of Jamaica ("BOJ").43 Dextra drew the check on the
assumption that it would constitute a loan to BOJ under a secured
loan agreement with BOJ. 44 However, that loan agreement was
never concluded. Agents whom BOJ reimbursed in advance of
receiving the check had arranged the check on BOJ's behalf. The
Privy Council held that Dextra was not entitled to restitution of the
money as money paid by mistake of fact because Dextra had paid the
money on the basis of a misprediction (that a loan agreement would
be entered into) and not a mistake. 4 5 In any event, BOJ had the
defense of change of position to the claim by virtue of their
reimbursement of their agents. It did not matter that the change of
position was anticipatory. In the words of Lords Goff and Bingham,
giving the opinion of the Privy Council,
Here what is in issue is the justice or injustice of enforcing
a restitutionary claim in respect of a benefit conferred. In
that context, it is difficult to see what relevant distinction
can be drawn between (1) a case in which the defendant
expends on some extraordinary expenditure all or part of a
sum of money which he has received from the plaintiff, and
(2) one in which the defendant incurs such expenditure in
the expectation that he will receive the sum of money from
the plaintiff, which he does in fact receive. Since ex
hypothesi the defendant will in fact have received the
expected payment, there is no question of the defendant
using the defence of change of position to enforce, directly

takes into account hedging contracts, there may be further consequential
contracts to take account of, and to avoid endless inquiries it is preferable to
treat all such losses as too remote.
42. [2002] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 193 (P.C.) (Eng.). See also obiter dicta of
Jonathan Parker J in Phillip Collins Ltd. v. Davis, [2000] 3 All E.R. 808, 827
(Ch.) (Eng.), who stated:
[W]hether or not a change of position may be anticipatory, it must (as
I see it) have been made as a consequence of the receipt of, or (it may
be) the prospect of receiving, the money sought to be recovered: in
other words it must, on the evidence, be referable in some way to the
payment of that money.
43. See Dextra Bank & Trust Co., [2002] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) at 195.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 202.
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or indirectly, a claim to that money. It is surely no abuse of
language to say, in the second case as in the first, that the
defendant has incurred the expenditure in reliance on the
plaintiff's payment or, as is sometimes said, on the faith of
46
the payment.
2. Does change of position apply only to extraordinary expenses?
It is sometimes said that to count as a change of position,
expenses incurred by the defendant must be extraordinary. 47 The
ambiguity of that qualification can cause confusion. The only
requirement is that the defendant would not have otherwise incurred
those expenses (i.e., that they are extraordinary to the defendant).
Whether the expenses are extraordinary in the sense of being used to
buy luxuries as opposed to everyday items, like food and drink, is not
decisive.
3. What standard of proof does the defendant need to attain in
establishing change of position?
It is submitted that, while there is no reason to depart from the
normal balance of probabilities standard, a broad-brush approach
should be taken which would tend to favor defendants. This is in
line with the need for change of position to be a wide defense so as
to prevent too much restitution and to ensure security of receipt. It
would impose an excessively onerous burden on defendants to
require them, for example, to show precisely how each item of
money received had been spent.
In RBC Dominion Securities Inc. v. Dawson,48 the
Newfoundland Court of Appeal held that, in relation to change of
position consequent on a mistaken payment, while the onus of
proving change of position was on the defendant, detailed evidence
of expenditure by the defendant was not required. 49 Reasonable
approximation was sufficient. The court said,
The appellant argues that the respondents should have been
required to submit receipts, dates of purchase and precise
46. Id. at 204.
47. See PETER D. MADDAUGH & JOHN D. MCCAMUS, THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION 232-34 (1990).

48. [1994] 111 D.L.R. (4th) 230 (Nfld.).

49. See id. at 240.
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amounts rather than oral evidence and estimates. Certainly,
the best evidence available should be provided the court.
However, to require that a private individual, who believed
she was spending her own money, prove her expenditures
as if she were claiming damages in an action for negligence
would be most unfair. It was the plaintiff's error that put
her in the funds in the first place and led her to believe the
funds were hers to spend without having to account to
anyone for her expenditures ....
In the circumstances, the
trial judge was not in error to be satisfied with reasonable
approximations. 50
Jonathan Parker J took a similar approach in Philip Collins Ltd.
v. Davis.5 1 Two musicians forming a backing band to the pop-star
Phil Collins had been mistakenly overpaid. They successfully raised
a change of position defense regarding half the overpayment on the
ground that their general philosophy of life was to alter their lifestyle
according to their income. 52 The court concluded that it was not
necessary for them to account precisely for how they had spent the
money.53 Instead, the court adopted a broad approach.5 4
The Court of Appeal approved this approach in obiter dicta in
Scottish Equitableplc v. Derby.5 5 Walker U said,
I would.., accept that it may be right for the court not to
apply too demanding a standard of proof when an honest
defendant says that he has spent an overpayment by
improving his lifestyle, but cannot produce any detailed
accounting: see the observations of Jonathan Parker J in
Philip Collins Ltd v. Davis with which I respectfully
56
agree.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
[2000] 3 All E.R. 808 (Ch.) (Eng.).
See id. at 813.
See id. at 830.
See id. at 827.
[2001] 3 All E.R. 818 (C.A.) (Eng.).
Id. at 827-28 (citations omitted).
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4. What if the defendant's expenses were incurred in purchasing
property that he still retains?
The fourth issue pertains to a situation where the defendant still
retains the property he purchased with the mistakenly paid money.
For example, say the defendant uses an overpayment of £500 to buy
a television. The television could now be sold for £300. Assuming
that he would not otherwise have bought the property, there are two
possible lines of argument. One is that the defendant is not worse off
to the full extent of the money spent for he retains the pecuniary
value of the property-he has changed his position to the extent of
the difference between what the property cost him and, in the usual
case, its resale value (i.e., his change of position is £200).
Alternatively, it might be argued that, applying the strict logic of
subjective devaluation through to the defense of change of position,
it is irrelevant that the defendant still retains the property unless he is
reasonably certain to realize its value (i.e., his change of position is
£500)-otherwise to deny the defendant a full change of position
defense would force him either to sell the property or to end up
paying for property that he would not otherwise have chosen to buy.
The former argument is more attractive. 57
Subjective
devaluation should carry less force once the claimant has established
the defendant's prima facie restitutionary liability and the focus has
switched to whether there is a defense. Moreover, the defendant
seeking to establish his change of position is in an analogous position
to a claimant who seeks to prove his loss in order to recover
compensatory damages. In that context, the duty to mitigate one's
loss dictates that the claimant cannot deny that he is benefited by
property that should reasonably be realized. In addition, the former
argument is supported by dicta of Lord Templeman (whose
reasoning on the application of change of position was agreed with
by a majority of the Lords) in Lipkin Gorman:
[I]f the donee spent £20,000 in the purchase of a motor car
which he would not have purchased but for the gift, it
seems to me that the donee has altered his position on the
faith of the gift and has only been unjustly enriched to the
57. Contra Peter Birks, Overview: Tracing, Claiming and Defences, in

LAUNDERING AND TRACING 289, 331-32 (Peter Birks ed., 1995) (appearing to

favor the latter "subjective devaluation" argument).
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extent of the secondhand value of the motor car at the date
58
when the victim of the theft seeks restitution.
To avoid any doubt, it must be stressed that this issue has
nothing to do with tracing. The claimant is not seeking to establish
that he can trace to the property bought.
5. To what extent is the fault of the defendant (or the claimant)
relevant to change of position?
Certainly a defendant who has changed his position in bad faith
(i.e., dishonestly) is disqualified from raising the defense (hence
Lord Goff's emphasis on good faith change of position in Lipkin
Gorman). Yet, is it relevant that the defendant has merely been
negligent, for example, in failing to realize that he was not entitled to
the benefit or in foolishly changing his position? Given that change
of position is not an all-or-nothing defense, the defendant's
"contributory negligence" could be taken into account to reduce the
relevant loss.
This is the position under the New Zealand statutory defense of
change of position as laid down in Thomas v. Houston Corbett &
Co.59 Here, a solicitor's clerk fraudulently induced the claimant firm
of solicitors to pay £1,381 into the defendant's bank account as part
of a scheme to convince the defendant that he was making a profit
The defendant relied on
from money paid to the clerk to invest.
that money being his by paying a further £840 to the clerk.6 ' Upon
discovering the fraud, the claimant sought to recover its mistaken
payment of £1,381 from the defendant. 62 Applying a causation test
for restitution of mistaken payments-and rejecting the need for
58. [1991] 2 A.C. 548, 560 (H.L.) (Eng.); cf RBC Dominion Sec. Inc. v.
Dawson, (1994) 111 D.L.R. (4th) 230 (Nfld.) (ignoring, without explanation,
the fact that the defendant kept furniture bought with (and which would not
have been bought but for) the overpayment, and reasoning that a broad-brush
approach to change of position was more appropriate than a precise approach).
However, where real property has been purchased, not as an investment but to
live in, the position would be different. The defendant can deny that he is
benefited by the property and it would be unreasonable to require him to
realize it-that is, his change of position should relate to the full expenditure
without a deduction for the resale value of the property.
59. [1969] N.Z.L.R. 151 (C.A. 1968).
60. See id. at 159.
61. See id.
62. See id.at 160.
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supposed liability between payor and payee-the court held that the
claimant firm was prima facie entitled to recover the money subject
to the change of position defense embodied in section 94B of the
Judicature Act 1908.63
In "balancing the equities" and deciding which of the parties
should have spotted the fraud, the New Zealand Court of Appeal held
that the defendant, as a young and inexperienced doctor, was onethird at fault for his change of position, whereas the claimant
solicitors were two-thirds responsible. 64 The relevant change of
position was therefore reduced by a third from £840 to £560.
Restitution of £821 was therefore ordered.65
To give a further simple example, imagine that C pays D £100
by mistake. D changes his position to the tune of £80. If both
parties are equally at fault, then a "contributory negligence"
approach to change of position means that C would have restitution
of £60 (i.e., £100 - 80 + 80/2).
The New Zealand Court of Appeal applied the same
contributory negligence approach to the non-statutory change of
position defense in National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. v. Waitaki
InternationalProcessing(NI) Ltd.66 Here, the defendant was held to
have a 90% change of position defense. 67 The court compared the
fault of the parties: the claimant bank's fault in making the mistaken
payment and the defendant's fault in losing the money in an
imprudent unsecured investment. The court assessed the bank's fault
at 90% and the defendant's at 10%, so that the defendant's change of
position defense was reduced by 10%.68
Should the English version of change of position follow the
approach in New Zealand? It is submitted that the introduction of
contributory negligence would involve too much uncertainty and
complexity, and would hamper out of court settlements. One would
not want most restitution cases descending into disputes about
comparative blameworthiness.

63. See id. at 163-64.

64. See id. at 164-65.
65. See id. at 165.
66. [1999] 2 N.Z.L.R. 211 (C.A. 1998).
67. See id.
68. Seeid. at211-12.
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Much more difficult is whether one would want a pragmatic allor-nothing approach to fault under which the defendant would be
disqualified from the change of position defense if clearly more at
fault than the claimant. 69 This was the approach I favored in the first
edition of The Law of Restitution. There, I also stressed that the
relevant fault of the claimant and the defendant was, respectively,
avoiding making payment (or avoiding conferring another type of
benefit) and avoiding relying on it as one's own. 70 A possible
problem with this is that all-or-nothing approaches, by definition,
tend to be conducive of some injustice. Also, it can be argued that,
provided the defendant was acting in good faith and honestlythereby ruling out, for example, the defendant who silently knows of
the claimant's mistake 71 or who founds his change of position on
criminal expenditure-there is no principled reason to exclude
negligently incurred change of position.
In Dextra Bank & Trust Co., the Privy Council has now rejected
the relevance of the defendant's fault short of bad faith.72 Having
looked at the New Zealand cases, Lords Goff and Bingham thought
that the introduction of what they termed "relative fault" would
render the defense of change of position too uncertain.73 Their
central conclusion was expressed as follows: "Their Lordships
are.., most reluctant to recognise the propriety of introducing the
concept of relative fault into this branch of the common law, and
indeed decline to do so."' 74 Moreover, their Lordships thought it
would be very strange to examine the fault of the parties given the
well-established starting point for mistaken payments that
69. See Jack Beatson & William Bishop, Mistaken Payments in the Law of

Restitution, 36 U. TORONTO L.J. 149 (1986) (labeling this "relative fault" as

distinct from "comparative fault"). The Restatement of the Law of Restitution
section 142(2) also appears to adopt a relative fault approach. RESTATEMENT
OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 142(2) (1937).
70. See BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION,

supra note 36, at 430-31.

71. See, e.g., Nat'l Bank of New Zealand Ltd. v. Waitaki Int'l Processing
(NI) Ltd. [1999] 2 N.Z.L.R. 211 (where the defendant was acting in good faith
even though it knew of the claimant's mistake because it had reluctantly kept
the money having told the claimant of the mistake).
72. See Dextra Bank & Trust Co., [2002] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) at 207; see
also Peter Birks, Change ofPosition and Surviving Enrichment, in THE LIMITS
CLAIMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 41 (William
Swadling ed., 1997); GOFF AND JONES (5th ed.), supranote 16, at 826.
OF RESTITUTIONARY

73. See DextraBank & Trust Co., [2002] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) at 205-07.
74. Id. at 207.
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restitutionary liability is strict so that the fault of the payor does not
bar restitution. 75 With respect, this latter point is unconvincing.
Strict liability goes hand-in-glove with unjust enrichment. But the
issue of change of position rests on the defendant having been
disenriched and it is hard to see why the same considerations as to
fault should necessarily apply in relation to that issue.
6. To what extent does change of position apply beyond mistaken
payments or money paid away without the owner's consent?
Change of position will no doubt be primarily applied to
mistaken payments and to money paid to the defendant without the
knowledge of its owner. But there seems no reason in principle why
it should not apply as a defense with respect to any type of benefit
and with respect to other unjust factors, provided the defendant does
not fall foul of the bad faith disqualification (as he or she often will
where the unjust factor is duress, undue influence, or exploitation of
weakness). For example, in Goss v. Chilcott,76 the Privy Council
accepted that change of position was a possible defense to a claim for
total failure of consideration even though, on the particular facts, that
defense failed.7 7 Similarly, in the swaps cases, change of position
was regarded as a possible defense irrespective of whether the
ground for restitution was treated as being total failure of
consideration, absence of consideration, or mistake of law.
What about restitution for wrongs? Clearly, change of position
is irrelevant to compensation for wrongs. But the position is not so
obvious in relation to restitution for wrongs assuming that the
wrongdoer was not dishonest and has therefore changed his or her
position in good faith. The essence of change of position is that it
allows a good faith defendant to claim that, although enriched, the
enrichment has caused him or her to suffer a "loss," which should be
taken into account in arriving at the measure of restitution. That

75. See id.
76. [1996] 1 A.C. 789 (P.C.) (N.Z.).
77. Clarifying the reason why the defense failed is not easy.

The

defendants had been loaned money under a mortgage instrument that had been
avoided. They had then in turn lent the money, without security, to a third
party.

One possible reason for denying change of position is that the

defendants were no worse off because they would otherwise have taken out a
valid loan, which they would have had to repay.
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reasoning may be thought relevant to restitution from an innocent
wrongdoer just as it is in relation to unjust enrichment by subtraction.
It is true that section 142(2) of the United States Restatement of
the Law of Restitution says that change of position is not available to
a tortfeasor. 78 This may be what Lord Goff had in mind when in
Lipkin Gorman he said, "it is commonly accepted that the defence
should not be open to a wrongdoer." 79 However, it cannot be argued
that Lord Goff was definitively laying that down as the law. In the
next sentence he said,
These are matters, which can, in due course, be considered
in depth in cases where they arise for consideration. They
do not arise in the present case. Here there is no doubt that
the respondents have acted in good faith throughout, and
the action is not founded upon any wrongdoing of the
respondents. 80
In considering whether it is at least arguable that change of
position is applicable with respect to restitution for wrongs, it might
help to focus on an example. D, a little old lady, buys a painting
from X, who is a rogue and has stolen the painting from C. D has
been honest and indeed has acted reasonably. She sells the painting
at well above its market price for £10,000. She then uses that money
to take a once-in-a-lifetime holiday. C, the owner, brings an action
in the tort of conversion against D and claims £10,000 in an action
for money had and received. D wishes to raise the defense of change
of position to the restitutionary claim for the conversion on the
ground that she changed her position in honest reliance on that
money being hers and has, therefore, "lost" the enrichment.
The (admittedly sparse) academic discussion of this question
tends to the view that change of position should be available in this
sort of situation. 81 For example, Goff and Jones give as an
illustration of where change of position may be invoked, other than
in respect of mistaken payments, a claim based on an innocent
82
breach of confidence. They write,
78. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 142(2) (1937).
79. Lipkin Gorman, [1991] 2 A.C. at 580.

80. Id.
81. In addition to the views cited below, see Phillip Hellwege, The Scope of
Application of Change of Position in the Law of Unjust Enrichment: A
ComparativeStudy, 1999 RESTITUTION L. REV. 92, 96-100.
82. See GOFF & JONES (5th ed.), supra note 16, at 820 n.21.
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A defendant who did not know and ought not to have
known that he was betraying another's confidence acts
honestly. He may then plead change of position. In our
view, a defendant who is honest but ought to have known of
the breach of confidence should also be allowed to invoke
83
the defence.
Furthermore, they later suggest that wrongdoers who have not acted
in bad faith or with a want of probity should be able to invoke the
84
defense.
Richard Nolan, in his essay Change of Position,writes:
[N]ot all... wrongs involve fault, or some turpitude or
want of probity on the part of the defendant: for example, a
claim for an account of profits from a fiduciary does not
necessarily entail any wickedness on the part of the
fiduciary. Now if an innocent fiduciary obliged to make
restitution in respect of profits made in breach of duty can
be awarded an allowance for his skill by way of counterrestitution [as in Boardman v. Phipps85] then, assuming
Lord Goff has not ruled out any application of change of
position in the context of restitution for wrongs, it would
seem odd if the law could take into account the defendant's
conferring of a benefit on the plaintiff, but be unable to take
into account any other way in which the defendant had
changed his position: both the allowance and the defence
are directed to ensuring that the defendant is not worse off
in consequence of making restitution to the plaintiff.
Perhaps, then, change of position may have a very limited
role to play in the context of restitution for wrongs, where
the wrong in question is a wrong as a matter of law only.86
Similarly, Virgo argues that change of position may be a defense to
restitution for a wrong depending on whether the wrong was
87
committed in bad faith or not.
83. Id. at 763.

84. See id. at 826.
85. [1967] 2 A.C. 46 (H.L. 1966) (Eng.).
86. Richard Nolan, Change of Position,in LAUNDERING AND TRACING 135,

154 (Peter Birks ed., 1995) (internal citations omitted).

87. See GRAHAM VIRGO, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION
727 (1999); Graham Virgo, What is the Law of Restitution About?, in
RESTITUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 321 (Cornish et al. eds., 1998).
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Finally, Andrew Tettenborn writes that he regards Lord Goff's
statement in Lipkin Gorman as a little difficult to understand, and
that a blanket refusal to apply change of position to restitution for
wrongs is neither necessary nor desirable. 88 He points to an innocent
wrongdoer, such as the unwitting converter, and states, "It is hard to
see why he should not have the benefit of the defence if the plaintiff
chooses to waive the tort and sue for money had and received. 89
Pitted against these views is the argument that change of
position is inextricably bound up with the cause of action of unjust
enrichment alone; that the security of receipt that change of position
is designed to ensure is not relevant to restitution for wrongs. In
other words, the cause of action of unjust enrichment requires a
reversal of a transfer of wealth for reasons that do not relate to the
need to "remedy" a wrong. On this argument, change of position
operates to counter the non-wrongful transfer of wealth but can never
90
outweigh the policies justifying restitution for a wrong.
At the present stage in the law's development-and particularly
in light of the different possible arguments-the safest conclusion is
that it is unclear whether change of position can ever apply to
restitution for wrongs.
7. Should change of position apply to proprietary, as well as
personal, restitutionary remedies?
Although there has, as yet, been no case law on point, in
principle change of position should apply with respect to proprietary,
as well as personal, restitutionary remedies. 91 By definition,
proprietary restitution is triggered by the defendant's unjust
enrichment at the claimant's expense. Therefore, to ignore the
defendant's change of position in relation to proprietary restitution is
to ignore a fundamental aspect of the explanation and justification of
proprietary restitution. In other words, whether the response to
unjust enrichment is personal or proprietary should not affect the
central elements of the unjust enrichment inquiry. It would also
88. See ANDREW TETTENBORN, LAW OF RESTITUTION IN ENGLAND AND
IRELAND 253-54 (2d ed. 1996).
89. Id. at 254.
90. See Birks, supranote 57, at 325-26 (favoring this view).
91. See id. at 319-22, 326-27; GOFF & JONES (5th ed.), supra note 16, at
110-11, 824-25; JILL E. MARTIN, HANBURY AND MARTIN MODERN EQUITY

701-03 (16th ed. 2001).
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produce the oddity that a claimant would be presented with the
opportunity to outflank the change of position defense by invoking
proprietary, rather than personal, restitution.
Say, for example, C mistakenly pays D £5,000. D buys shares
with that money. Relying on his new financial security, D then treats
himself to a holiday for £1,000. D is clearly entitled to raise the
change of position defense to C's personal claim for £5,000. It
would be odd if C could avoid the change of position defense by
instead bringing a proprietary claim to the shares. This is because
the best explanation of that proprietary claim is that it is concerned
with reversing D's unjust enrichment at C's expense.
It is submitted that the position would be different if C was
bringing a pure proprietary claim or was claiming compensatory
damages for conversion. Such claims are not triggered by unjust
enrichment and are therefore not diminished by the change of
position defense. Indeed, this is the most important practical reason
why the House of Lords in Foskett v. McKeown 92 can be criticized
for relying on pure proprietary (rather than restitutionary proprietary)
reasoning to explain the proprietary claim following tracing. That
reasoning would produce
the incorrect result in relation to the change
93
of position defense.
How does one give effect to pro tanto change of position in
relation to proprietary restitution? Where the remedy in question is
an equitable lien, there is no difficulty. The lien affords a security
interest over particular property in relation to a particular sum of
money and there is no difficulty in reducing the sum of money
secured to take account of the change of position. In the example
given above, the lien would therefore secure £4,000 rather than
£5,000.
The more difficult case is where the remedy in question is a
(sole or proportionate) beneficial interest in property. For example,
C may be given equitable ownership of shares. That interest cannot
be reduced by a fixed amount to reflect the defendant's change of
position. However, there seems to be no reason why the claim to a
92. [2000] 2 W.L.R. 1299 (H.L.) (Eng.).
93. Cf GRAHAM VIRGO, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 727

(1999) (arguing that change of position should be a defense to personal and
proprietary claims even if founded on what he terms "the vindication of
proprietary rights").
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beneficial interest should not be made conditional on C paying D a
fixed amount equivalent to D's change of position. Therefore, in the
example above, C may be given beneficial ownership of the shares
subject to his paying D £1,000. The imposition of terms on a
claimant seeking a remedy is well established in relation to equitable
remedies, such as rescission 94 and specific performance, 95 and there
seems no reason why it should not be applied here.
It follows that in In re Diplock,96 if the claimants had been able
to trace their money to new or improved buildings (it was held,
incorrectly, that such tracing was not possible 97), the defendant
should have had a change of position defense. 98 But for the receipt
of the money, the buildings would not have been built or improved
and the outlay could not now be recouped.
There is one final important point in relation to change of
position and proprietary claims following tracing. One must be
careful to distinguish between two separate questions. The first
question is whether the enrichment traceably survives. This depends
on the rules of tracing and has nothing to do with the defense of
change of position. If the property has been lost or destroyed, tracing
is not possible and one does not need to consider change of position
as a defense to a proprietary claim. However, if the enrichment
traceably survives, a second question is whether the defendant has a
change of position defense to a proprietary claim to that traced
property. The fact that the enrichment traceably survives does not
mean that no change of position defense is possible. Thus, in the
example above, the enrichment traceably survives in the shares and
yet D can still invoke the change of position defense because, in
reliance on having the shares, he has spent money on a holiday that
he would not otherwise have bought.
94. See, e.g., Solle v. Butcher, [1950] 1 K.B. 671 (1949) (Eng.); Cooper v.
Phibbs, [1867] 2 L.R. 149 (H.L.) (Eng.).
95. See, e.g., In re Fawcett & Holmes' Contract, [1889] 42 App. Cas. 150
(Eng.); Harvela Invs. Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co. of Canada, [1986] 1 A.C. 207
(H.L. 1985) (Eng.); see generally ANDREW BURROWs, REMEDIES FOR TORTS
AND BREACH OF CONTRACT 383-85 (2d ed. 1994) (describing specific
performance as a remedy).
96. [1948] 1 Ch. 465, 545-48 (Eng.).
97. For criticism of the Lordships' reasoning that tracing is not possible
once the money has been used to alter, or improve, real property, see LIONEL
D. SMITH, THE LAW OF TRACING 241 (1997).
98. See GOFF & JONES (5th ed.), supranote 16, at 110-11.
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Conversely, of course, property may not traceably survive and
yet, the defendant may be unable to establish a change of position
defense. For example, the defendant may expend the money he
received on paying off debts that he would, in any event, have had to
pay. Although there is then no traceably surviving property, the
defendant cannot establish a change of position defense.
8. What is the relationship between change of position and estoppel?
Estoppel is narrower than change of position in that it requires
the defendant to establish that its change of position was induced by
a representation made by the claimant. On the other hand, it may be
that the effect of estoppel-deriving from its traditional status as a
rule of evidence-is more drastic in constituting a total, rather than a
partial, defense.
A leading case is Avon County Council v. Howlett.99 The
100
defendant there was mistakenly overpaid £1,007 sick pay.
Although the Court of Appeal was satisfied that the defendant had
detrimentally relied on the plaintiffs representation to the extent of
the full amount paid, his pleaded case-for the purpose of making
this a test case-merely alleged detrimental reliance of £546.61.
This was because the defendant had not claimed additional social
security benefits he would otherwise have claimed, and had bought a
car on hire-purchase and a suit which he would not otherwise have
bought. 101

Assuming a mistake of fact rather than of law (which the Court
of Appeal thought was narrowly established), could the plaintiff
recover the balance of £460.39? Cumming-Bruce LJ refused to
decide a question not raised by the true facts, but Slade LJ and
Eveleigh LJ held that estoppel operates as a total defense, even on
the facts as pleaded, so that the plaintiff could not recover any of its
mistaken payment. 10 2 Slade LJ argued that this followed as a matter
of principle from the nature of estoppel by representation as a rule of
evidence, "the consequence of which is simply to preclude the
representor from averring facts contrary to his own
99. [1983] 1 All E.R. 1073 (C.A. 1982) (Eng.).
100. See id.

101. See id.
at 1077 (opinion of Eveleigh, L.J.).
102. See id. at 1074-89 (opinions of Cumming-Bruce, L.J., Slade, L.J., and
Eveleigh, L.J.).
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representation."'' 0 3 If the representation is "this £500 is yours,"
estoppel prevents the payor denying that the £500 validly belongs to
the payee. As the statement is non-divisible, so must be the defense.
There are two possible counter-arguments to that line of
reasoning.
First, it may be doubted whether estoppel by
representation should be seen as a rule of evidence rather than a
substantive legal principle. One would surely not want to describe
promissory estoppel, for example, as a rule of evidence whatever its
historical origins. And as a substantive principle, the judges in Avon
accept that the just solution would be to allow estoppel to operate in
apro tanto way.
Secondly, even playing the artificial "rule of evidence game,"
one can argue, somewhat artificially perhaps, that a single
representation is divisible into separate internal representations or
parts. Hence, while the plaintiff in Avon was estopped from denying
the statement (or that part of the statement) that £546.61 belonged to
the defendant, he should have been free to deny the statement (or that
part of the statement) that £460.39 belonged to the defendant. The
argument is less artificial where, as in Avon, there are continuing
payments and hence clearly more than one possible representation.
Having knocked out a pro tanto in form, Slade U left open the
question whether estoppel could operate pro tanto in substance by
making its application conditional on the defendant's undertaking to
repay a certain sum to the plaintiff; a course considered appropriate
by Viscount Cave LC, with whom Lord Atkinson agreed, in his
10 4
dissenting judgment in Jones Ltd. v. Waring & Gillow Ltd.
Eveleigh U, without explaining how this would fit in with his denial
of a pro tanto estoppel, baldly said, "there may be circumstances
which would render it unconscionable for the defendant to retain a
balance in his hands." 10 5 Presumably, it was the hypothetical nature
of the facts that made it unnecessary for the judges to tie up those
loose ends.
There is no doubt that the defense of change of position
recognized in Lipkin Gorman can operate pro tanto and is therefore a
more flexible and just defense. Indeed, Lord Goff referred to the allor-nothing reasoning of Avon as one argument for accepting change
103. Id. at 1087.
104. [1926] 1 A.C. 670, 677 (H.L.) (Eng.).
105. Avon, [1983] 1 All E.R. at 1078.
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But short of taking a very radical and forced
of position.
interpretation of Lord Goff's judgment, the House of Lords has not
wiped out estoppel as a restitutionary defense. It follows that, unless
the above suggested ways around Avon are utilized, the
unsatisfactory result remains that, despite Lipkin Gorman, a
defendant can avoid pro tanto change of position by establishing
estoppel.
Cases subsequent to Lipkin Gorman have accepted that all-ornothing estoppel survives, but have then relied on the
unconscionability exception in Avon to escape from the
consequences of that conclusion. In Scottish Equitable plc v.
Derby,10 7 the defendant had a pension policy with the claimant,
Scottish Equitable. In 1990, the defendant exercised an option to
take early retirement benefit under that policy so that he was paid
£36,588 and £4,655 per annum. 10 8 This left about £50,000 to be paid
under the pension. Five years later, on his 65th birthday, Scottish
Equitable told him that his pension was worth £201,938.1"9 Scottish
Equitable had mistakenly forgotten about his earlier exercise of the
option. In truth, his pension was worth £29,486. The defendant
queried the matter but Scottish Equitable confirmed orally, and in
writing, the higher figure. Then Scottish Equitable went ahead and
paid him the £201,938, an overpayment of £ 172,451. 1"0
The defendant (who was held to be naive but honest) spent
£9,662 on modest improvements in his lifestyle; £41,671 in reducing
his mortgage; and invested the £121,100 in a pension, which would
pay him annually £11,000 more than he would otherwise have been
paid."' A year later, Scottish Equitable realized its mistake and
sought to recover the overpayment less the £9,662, which it
conceded, fell within the change of position defense. The Court of
Appeal, upholding Harrison J, held that its claim to £162,900 should
succeed.112 The £41,700 that the defendant used to pay the mortgage
did not constitute a change of position because that was a debt that
he had had to pay anyway, so he was no worse off by having paid it.
106. See GOFF & JONES (5th ed.), supranote 16, at 828-29.
107. [2001] 3 All E.R. 818 (C.A.) (Eng.).

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See id. at 821.
See id.
See id. at 822.
Seeid. at 823.
Seeid. at819.
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The £121,000 paid into the pension could now be unwound without
difficulty, leaving the defendant with the same pension entitlement
he would have had had he not been overpaid.
Most importantly, the Court of Appeal held that the defendant
could not rely on estoppel-constituted by his detrimental reliance
on the claimant's representation that he was entitled to the money-so as to give him a total defense. 113 This was because, although Avon
remained good law until overruled by the House of Lords, the facts
of this case fell comfortably within its unconscionability
exception. 114
The same approach was taken in National Westminster Bankplc
v. Somer International (UK) Ltd.115 where the claimant bank
mistakenly credited the defendant's account approximately U.S.
$76,708. The defendant was expecting a payment from a customer,
Mentor, and was led to believe by the claimant's representation that
this payment was the sum being credited to its account. 1 16 As a
result, the defendant dispatched goods to Mentor to the value of
£13,180. The Court of Appeal rejected the defendant's argument
that it had a complete estoppel defense to the claim for restitution
and instead awarded restitution of the difference between U.S.
$76,700 and £13,180.1" In line with Scottish Equitable plc, the
unconscionability exception in Avon was applied so that, in
substance if not in form, the estoppel operated pro tanto.18 In the
words of Peter Gibson LJ, "the circumstances here ...are such that
the disparity between the U.S. $76,708 mistakenly credited to Somer
and £13,180, being the value of goods dispatched by Somer in
reliance on the Bank's representation, makes
it unconscionable and
' 19
inequitable for Somer to retain the balance." "
However, in practice-and leaving to one side where there is an
insignificant, de minimis, difference between the value of the
defendant's change of position and the payment received-it will
surely always be unjust and unconscionable for the defendant to
retain a balance. In other words, the Avon exception swallows up its
113. See id.
at 831.
114. Seeid.at 829.

115. [2002] 1 All E.R. 198 (C.A. 2001) (Eng.).
116.
117.
118.
119.

Seeid. at201.
See id.
at 215-16.
See id. at 220.
Id.
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all-or-nothing rule. Estoppel will always, by this means, operate in a
pro tanto fashion. The cleaner approach would be to recognize this,
and to clarify that, in contrast to change of position, the all-ornothing estoppel defense is in this context inapt and should be
excised.
The Newfoundland Court of Appeal in RBC Dominion
Securities Inc. favored this approach.120 In light of the acceptance of
change of position in Canada in Rural Municipality of Storthoaks v.
Mobil Oil CanadaLtd.,1

Cameron JA said,

To make the estoppel defense one which operates pro tanto
would be inconsistent with the most commonly accepted
view of estoppel: that it is a rule of evidence which
prevents evidence of the event which resulted in the change
of circumstances from being considered. We conclude that
estoppel is no22longer an appropriate method of dealing with
the problem. 1

One can regard the controversy concerning Avon as turning on
which aspect of the unjust enrichment principle estoppel relates to.
On the one hand, the requirement of detrimental reliance seems to be
concerned with the defendant's loss of the benefit received (i.e.,
enrichment). Viewed in this way, estoppel should wither away
because its all-or-nothing approach is too inflexible in comparison
with change of position.
On the other hand, one could regard estoppel as relating to the
injustice of an enrichment. The plaintiff s mistake, while prima facie
rendering the enrichment unjust, is cancelled out by his detrimentally
relied-upon representation that the money belongs to the defendant.
Hence the traditional explanation that estoppel prevents the plaintiff
averring the facts contrary to those represented (i.e., the plaintiff
cannot establish that he was mistaken).
The former view is to be preferred. The latter resorts to
artificiality in explaining why the unjust factor is overridden. No one
suggests that the representation per se cancels out the injustice and it
120. [1994] 111 D.L.R. (4th) 230 (Nfld.); see also Philip Collins Ltd. v.
Davis, [2000] 3 All E.R. 808, 826 (Ch.) (Eng.) (finding that a defense of
estoppel was no longer apt in restitutionary claims where the more flexible
defense of change of position was available).
121. [1975] 55 D.L.R. (3d) I (Can.).
122. RBC Dominion Sec., [1994] 111 D.L.R. (4th) at 237.
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is submitted that by requiring detrimental reliance the essence of the
defense is focused on the defendant's loss of benefit.
This, of course, is not to suggest that estoppel should disappear
in the many other areas of law in which it applies. Rather the
argument is that, in contrast to those other areas, in the law of
restitution the injustice that estoppel is concerned to prevent is
entirely, and more appropriately, achieved by another defense,
namely change of position.
III. CONCLUSION

Subsequent to the acceptance of the change of position defense
by the House of Lords in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale, the English
courts have slowly but surely been clarifying the ingredients of the
defense. Important recent cases have indicated that, for example, a
wide version of the defense that does not require reliance is to be
preferred but that the defense is not concerned with general hardship;
that anticipatory, as well as subsequent, change of position should
count; that fault, short of bad faith, should be irrelevant; and that
estoppel as a separate defense from change of position has little, if
any, role to play. These and the other issues of detail that have been
discussed in this Article are ones that any legal system which accepts
the change of position defense must seek to answer so as to provide
clarity and predictability in the law of restitution.

